On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games
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Publication:514491
DOI10.1007/S00199-016-1010-3zbMATH Open1401.91022OpenAlexW1562173397WikidataQ59615577 ScholiaQ59615577MaRDI QIDQ514491FDOQ514491
Authors: Nizar Allouch, Myrna Wooders
Publication date: 2 March 2017
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-1010-3
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- An Exact Bound on Epsilon for Nonemptiness of Epsilon Cores of Games
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Cited In (9)
- An Exact Bound on Epsilon for Nonemptiness of Epsilon Cores of Games
- Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments nonemptiness and equal treatment
- Some corrections to claims about the literature in Engl and Scotchmer (1996)
- Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Approximate Cores of Large Games
- Approximate cores of replica games and economies. I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores
- The not-quite non-atomic game: non-emptiness of the core in large production games
- Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment
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