Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments nonemptiness and equal treatment
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Publication:5954064
DOI10.1006/game.2000.0815zbMath1011.91007OpenAlexW1974429698MaRDI QIDQ5954064
Myrna Holtz Wooders, Alexander Kovalenkov
Publication date: 31 May 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/4a488bd7f9167c62e51ccb97b3d17dfd818df9dd
cooperative gamesapproximate corescore convergenceeffective small groupsequal treatmentgames without side paymentslarge gamesparameterized collections of games
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