Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments nonemptiness and equal treatment
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Publication:5954064
DOI10.1006/game.2000.0815zbMath1011.91007OpenAlexW1974429698MaRDI QIDQ5954064
Myrna Holtz Wooders, Alexander Kovalenkov
Publication date: 31 May 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/4a488bd7f9167c62e51ccb97b3d17dfd818df9dd
cooperative gamesapproximate corescore convergenceeffective small groupsequal treatmentgames without side paymentslarge gamesparameterized collections of games
Related Items (10)
On the core of dynamic cooperative games ⋮ Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs. ⋮ Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores ⋮ Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes ⋮ Market Games and Clubs ⋮ Networks and Stability ⋮ On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games ⋮ Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment ⋮ The instability of instability of centered distributions ⋮ Some corrections to claims about the literature in Engl and Scotchmer (1996)
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