The paper is dedicated to the theory of cooperative games with incomplete cooperation. Strong balancedness means in this context that the considered game is balanced for any choice of payoff functions of effective coalitions. It is shown that games with incomplete cooperation can be characterized by graph-theoretical tools, and that the strong balancedness is equivalent to the normality of the corresponding hypergraph. The general results are completed by economic examples of communication and assignment games.
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