Sorting out single-crossing preferences on networks
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Publication:2341131
DOI10.1007/s00355-014-0852-5zbMath1318.91056OpenAlexW2000199342MaRDI QIDQ2341131
Publication date: 23 April 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0852-5
Related Items (2)
Condorcet domains, median graphs and the single-crossing property ⋮ Preferences Single-Peaked on a Tree: Multiwinner Elections and Structural Results
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