Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
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Publication:1270060
DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2386zbMath0911.90134OpenAlexW1974122467MaRDI QIDQ1270060
Hideo Konishi, Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber
Publication date: 4 May 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2386
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
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