A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(79)90060-7zbMATH Open0402.90011OpenAlexW2170219120MaRDI QIDQ1255872FDOQ1255872

Authors: K. Appert 

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90060-7

zbMATH Keywords

CoreGeneral Equilibrium TheoryEconomies with Public GoodsNoncooperative Games of ExcahangeStrong Equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites Work

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• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• The Core of an N Person Game
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
• The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• A Tatonement Process for Public Goods
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Barriers to trade and disadvantageous middlemen: nonmonotonicity of the core
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (22)

• Every member of the core is as respectful as any other
• Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core
• An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
• Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
• The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
• Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
• Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
• Games of manipulation in marriage problems
• Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation
• Optimal provision of public goods through Nash equilibria
• STRATEGIC CORES IN A PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMY
• Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
• Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games
• USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION
• Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms
• Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics
• Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers
• A further note on the college admission game
• On the theory of cost sharing
• The recursive core for non-superadditive games
• When is a semi-honest secure multiparty computation valuable?
• Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks

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