A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3653906 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3671968 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3395596 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3084669 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Tatonement Process for Public Goods
- Barriers to trade and disadvantageous middlemen: nonmonotonicity of the core
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
- Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
- Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
- The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
- The Core of an N Person Game
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
Cited in
(22)- Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks
- Every member of the core is as respectful as any other
- Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core
- An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
- Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
- The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
- Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- Games of manipulation in marriage problems
- Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation
- Optimal provision of public goods through Nash equilibria
- STRATEGIC CORES IN A PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMY
- Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
- Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games
- USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION
- Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms
- Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics
- Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers
- A further note on the college admission game
- On the theory of cost sharing
- The recursive core for non-superadditive games
- When is a semi-honest secure multiparty computation valuable?
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