Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games
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Cites work
- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
- A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
- A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
- Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.
- Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation
- Credible coalitions and the core
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- Non-cooperative implementation of the core
- On the reduced game property and its converse
- Order independent equilibria
- Reduced games, consistency, and the core
- Stable coalition structures with externalities
Cited in
(8)- Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities
- Coalition formation in games with externalities
- The Nash bargaining solution in general \(n\)-person cooperative games
- Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities
- Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core
- Solving coalitional resource games
- The recursive nucleolus for partition function form games
- The recursive core for non-superadditive games
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