The Nash bargaining solution in general \(n\)-person cooperative games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.07.001zbMath1203.91013OpenAlexW1973105563MaRDI QIDQ617683

Akira Okada

Publication date: 13 January 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.07.001

zbMATH Keywords

corecoalitionNash bargaining solutionexternalitynoncooperative bargaining\(n\)-person cooperative games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (16)

Playing quantum games by a scheme with pre- and post-selection ⋮ A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: verifiable types ⋮ Partially cooperative games ⋮ Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game ⋮ Eliciting information from a committee ⋮ Dynamic bargaining with voluntary participation and externalities ⋮ Pledge-and-review bargaining ⋮ Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ A martingale problem associated with diffusion operators in a domain ⋮ A noncooperative foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution ⋮ The stationary equilibrium of three-person coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: a classification ⋮ Nash bargaining solution under externalities ⋮ Optimal Nash tuning rules for robust PID controllers ⋮ Some kinds of bargaining equilibria of multi-objective games ⋮ A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown ⋮ Bargaining delay under partial breakdowns and externalities

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