Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.
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Publication:1399513
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00011-3zbMath1040.91011MaRDI QIDQ1399513
Tomas Sjöström, Chen-Ying Huang
Publication date: 30 July 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00011-3
91A12: Cooperative games
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