A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
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Publication:1324093
DOI10.1006/game.1994.1030zbMath0807.90143OpenAlexW2041907395MaRDI QIDQ1324093
Publication date: 1 March 1995
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1030
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