Bargaining and bargaining sets.
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Publication:1864805
DOI10.1006/game.2001.0895zbMath1033.91010OpenAlexW2031620977MaRDI QIDQ1864805
Publication date: 23 March 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/0e9cc242be458f4b9527b2b59e4adc4a92abea8a
Games in extensive form (91A18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (12)
Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core ⋮ A noncooperative approach to the Mas-Colell bargaining set ⋮ Strategic justifications of the TAL family of rules for bankruptcy problems ⋮ Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities ⋮ Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem ⋮ Losing money to make money: the benefits of redistribution in collective bargaining in sports ⋮ Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem ⋮ Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: a strategic perspective ⋮ A noncooperative interpretation of the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set ⋮ A non-cooperative interpretation of the kernel ⋮ A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds ⋮ Bargaining set with endogenous leaders: a convergence result
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