A non-cooperative interpretation of the kernel
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Publication:521886
DOI10.1007/s00182-016-0529-7zbMath1398.91019OpenAlexW2256312440MaRDI QIDQ521886
Publication date: 12 April 2017
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0529-7
Related Items (3)
Strategic justifications of the TAL family of rules for bankruptcy problems ⋮ A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives ⋮ A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown
Cites Work
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- Convergent Transfer Schemes for N-Person Games
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