A non-cooperative interpretation of the kernel

DOI10.1007/s00182-016-0529-7zbMath1398.91019OpenAlexW2256312440MaRDI QIDQ521886

Chih Chang, Cheng-Cheng Hu

Publication date: 12 April 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0529-7

zbMATH Keywords

kernelsubgame perfect equilibriumNash programbargaining game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (3)

Strategic justifications of the TAL family of rules for bankruptcy problems ⋮ A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives ⋮ A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown

Cites Work

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• Convergent Transfer Schemes for N-Person Games
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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