Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00004-9MaRDI QIDQ1303885zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Peter Schölter, Jos Potters

Publication date 22 September 1999

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00004-9

zbMATH Keywords

Airport gameAirport problemModified nucleolusNucleolusWeighted Shapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3543876 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1082115 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• A characterization, existence proof and dimension bounds for the kernel of a game
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
• Serial Cost Sharing
• The Modified Nucleolus as Canonical Representation of Weighted Majority Games
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The Shapley Value as Aircraft Landing Fees–Revisited
• The general nucleolus and the reduced game property
• The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• The modified nucleolus: Properties and axiomatizations
• Uniqueness of the Shapley value

Cited in

(31)

• Characterizations of highway toll pricing methods
• A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems
• Sharing the losses of a hierarchical venture
• A random arrival rule for airport problems with fuzzy costs
• Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem
• A noncooperative view on two airport cost sharing rules
• A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives
• A characterization of the nucleolus without homogeneity in airport problems
• Professor Peter Sudhölter (1957--2024)
• A polynomial rule for the problem of sharing delay costs in PERT networks
• A note on the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game
• Sharing a collective probability of success
• Balancedness of infrastructure cost games.
• Sequentially compatible payoffs and the core in TU-games
• Balanced contributions, consistency, and value for games with externalities
• An axiomatic characterization of the Baker-Thompson rule
• A simple algorithm for the nucleolus of airport profit games
• Operations research games: A survey. (With comments and rejoinder)
• Monotonicity implications for the ranking of rules for airport problems
• The airport problem with capacity constraints
• Cost sharing in production economies
• Cost allocation and airport problems
• Coincidence of the Shapley value with other solutions satisfying covariance
• On the 1-nucleolus
• Airport games: the core and its center
• Consistency and its converse: an introduction
• Monotonicity of the core-center of the airport game
• A non-cooperative interpretation of the kernel
• Consistent queueing rules
• Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture
• On the core and nucleolus of directed acyclic graph games

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