A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives
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Publication:1753274
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.012zbMath1390.91029OpenAlexW2777881773MaRDI QIDQ1753274
Min-Hung Tsay, Cheng-Cheng Hu, Chun-Hsien Yeh
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.012
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