Shared irrigation costs: An empirical and axiomatic analysis
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Publication:1296484
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00013-9zbMath0927.90080OpenAlexW2014243814WikidataQ126339093 ScholiaQ126339093MaRDI QIDQ1296484
Publication date: 29 November 1999
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(97)00013-9
Operations research and management science (90B99) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (15)
A proposal for sharing costs ⋮ Coalitional desirability and the equal division value ⋮ Operations research games: A survey. (With comments and rejoinder) ⋮ A bankruptcy approach to solve the fixed cost allocation problem in transport systems ⋮ The airport problem with capacity constraints ⋮ A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games ⋮ Asymmetric cost sharing mechanisms ⋮ Sharing cost of network among users with differentiated willingness to pay ⋮ A characterization of the nucleolus without homogeneity in airport problems ⋮ Cooperative games and cost allocation problems ⋮ Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games ⋮ Cost Sharing in Production Economies ⋮ Pure Bargaining Problems and the Shapley Rule ⋮ A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives ⋮ Coherent cost-sharing rules
Cites Work
- Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy
- Internal Telephone Billing Rates—A Novel Application of Non-Atomic Game Theory
- A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
- A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
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