A characterization of the nucleolus without homogeneity in airport problems

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0524-ZMaRDI QIDQ431805zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yan-An Hwang, Chun-Hsien Yeh

Publication date 3 July 2012

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0524-z

zbMATH Keywords

airport problemsnucleolusShapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
• A simple expression for the nucleolus in a special case
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.
• Associated consistency and equal allocation of nonseparable costs
• Axiomatizations of game theoretical solutions for one-output cost sharing problems
• Minimality of consistent solutions for strategic games, in particular for potential games
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Shared irrigation costs: An empirical and axiomatic analysis
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• The modified nucleolus: Properties and axiomatizations
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The separability principle in bargaining

Cited in

(6)

• Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.
• A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives
• Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem
• Monotonicity implications for the ranking of rules for airport problems
• Cost allocation and airport problems
• An axiomatic characterization of the Baker-Thompson rule

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