Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.12.005MaRDI QIDQ417688zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Cheng-Cheng Hu, Min-Hung Tsay, Chun-Hsien Yeh

Publication date 14 May 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.005

zbMATH Keywords

airport problembilateral consistencyconstrained equal benefits ruleconverse consistencysubgame perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games in extensive form (91A18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Characterizations of the sequential equal contributions rule for the airport problem
• The airport problem with capacity constraints
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Cites work

• A characterization of the nucleolus without homogeneity in airport problems
• A non-cooperative interpretation of the \(f\)-just rules of bankruptcy problems
• A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.
• Bargaining and bargaining sets.
• Distributive justice in taxation
• Multilateral Bargaining
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems
• Reinterpreting the kernel
• Stability and Collective Rationality
• The converse consistency principle in bargaining.
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The prenucleolus and the reduced game property: Equal treatment replaces anonymity
• The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods

Cited in

(16)

• Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: a strategic perspective
• A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives
• Multi-issue bankruptcy problems with crossed claims
• Allocating extra revenues from broadcasting sports leagues
• Families of sequential priority rules and random arrival rules with withdrawal limits
• A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems
• The airport problem with capacity constraints
• A new analysis of a simple model of fair allocation
• Characterizations of the sequential equal contributions rule for the airport problem
• Monotonicity implications for the ranking of rules for airport problems
• Strategic justifications of the TAL family of rules for bankruptcy problems
• Divide and choose: an informationally robust strategic approach to bankruptcy problems
• Cost allocation and airport problems
• Bidding with coalitional externalities: a strategic approach to partition function form games
• Three rules for airport problems: characterizations via order preservation, dispersion minimization, and consistency
• An axiomatic characterization of the Baker-Thompson rule

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