The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90082-1MaRDI QIDQ1083005zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Hervé Moulin

Publication date 1985

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90082-1

zbMATH Keywords

social choicePareto optimalVickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanismseparability axiomutilitarian mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3543876 (Why is no real title available?)
• Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism in Quasi-Linear Bargaining
• Game theory and the Tennessee Valley Authority
• Group Decision Devices
• Stability and Collective Rationality
• The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus
• The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n- person noncooperative games

Cited in

(91)

• A note on passepartout problems
• Equivalence theorem, consistency and axiomatizations of a multi-choice value
• Duality and anti-duality in TU games applied to solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations
• Axiomatization for the center-of-gravity of imputation set value
• The unit-level-core for multi-choice games: the replicated core for TU games
• A note on the core: minimal conversely consistent enlargement
• Reduced games, consistency, and the core
• Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
• Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems
• Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values
• Stability and the Nash solution
• Consistency and dynamic approach of indexes
• An axiomatic characterization of the Baker-Thompson rule
• Consistency of the equal split-off set
• Consistency, weak fairness, and the Shapley value
• Strategy-proof allotment rules
• Procedural implementation and axiomatization of the weighted nonseparable cost value
• The general compromise value for cooperative games with transferable utility
• Core extensions for non-balanced TU-games
• Characterizations of a game theoretical cost allocation method
• Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core
• The precore: converse consistent enlargements and alternative axiomatic results
• Externalities, potential, value and consistency
• Max-consistency, complement-consistency and the core of fuzzy games
• On the equal surplus sharing interval solutions and an application
• Associated consistency characterization of two linear values for TU games by matrix approach
• Consistency of the Shapley NTU value in \(G\)-hyperplane games
• A group bargaining solution
• Consistent extensions and subsolutions of the core of multi-choice NTU games
• The equal collective gains value in cooperative games
• Recursive and bargaining values
• Agreement, separability, and other axioms for quasi-linear social choice problems
• Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus
• Reduced game and converse consistency
• Parametric rationing methods
• Coincidence of the Shapley value with other solutions satisfying covariance
• Process and optimization implementation of the \(\alpha \)-ENSC value
• On membership and marginal values
• Collinearity between the Shapley value and the egalitarian division rules for cooperative games
• Converse consistent enlargements of the unit-level-core of the multi-choice games
• Cooperation with externalities and uncertainty
• Consistent extensions and subsolutions of the core for the multichoice transferable-utility games
• Cheating by groups and cheating over time in surplus sharing problems
• Consistency and the core in games with externalities
• `Hydraulic' rationing
• Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
• The core and consistency properties: A general characterisation
• Fuzzy games: a characterization of the core
• Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
• The multi-core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi-choice games
• Optimization implementation and characterization of the equal allocation of nonseparable costs value
• Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem
• Reduced games and egalitarian solutions
• Separability and aggregation of equivalence relations
• The proportional solution for rights problems
• An NTU value under complement reduced game
• Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games
• Soundness, idempotence and commutativity of set-sharing
• Optimization implementation of solution concepts for cooperative games with stochastic payoffs
• An algorithm for the min-max loss rule for claims problems
• Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions
• The solidarity axiom for quasilinear social choice problems
• Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games
• Axiomatizations of the proportional division value
• The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration
• On the importance of reduced games in axiomatizing core extensions
• Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results
• Axiomatic characterizations of the CEA solution for rationing problems
• The family of ideal values for cooperative games
• The equal allocation of nonseparable costs: an extension under fuzzy behavior
• A generalization of the CIS value for cooperative cost games
• A union self-evaluation approach to associated consistency for cooperative games
• The equal split-off set for NTU-games
• CONSISTENCY FOR PROPORTIONAL SOLUTIONS
• Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7205326 (Why is no real title available?)
• Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games
• MOULIN REDUCTION, V-N REDUCTION AND AXIOMATIZATIONS OF THE DUPLICATE CORE
• Two optimal allocations under management systems: game-theoretical approaches
• Procedural and optimization implementation of the weighted ENSC value
• The \(\alpha \)-egalitarian Myerson value of games with communication structure
• Balanced externalities and the proportional allocation of nonseparable contributions
• Cohesive players: characterizations of a subclass of efficient, symmetric, and linear values
• The duplicate extension for the equal allocation of nonseparable costs
• Antiduality in exact partition games
• A NOTE ON CLOSEDNESS UNDER MOULIN REDUCTION
• An optimization characterization of the upper optimal complaint value
• On the core: complement-reduced game and max-reduced game
• Introduction to the special issue in honor of William Thomson
• Value-free reductions
• Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations

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