On membership and marginal values
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Publication:2376072
DOI10.1007/S00182-013-0367-9zbMath1269.91009OpenAlexW2053056619MaRDI QIDQ2376072
Jeffrey H. Weiss, Norman L. Kleinberg
Publication date: 26 June 2013
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0367-9
fairnessShapley valueBanzhaf valueegalitarian valueequal allocation of non-separable costsmembership value
Related Items (2)
A note on associated consistency and linear, symmetric values ⋮ Representation theory of the symmetric group in voting theory and game theory
Cites Work
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