On membership and marginal values

DOI10.1007/S00182-013-0367-9MaRDI QIDQ2376072zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Norman L. Kleinberg, Jeffrey Weiss

Publication date 26 June 2013

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0367-9

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessShapley valueBanzhaf valueegalitarian valueequal allocation of non-separable costsmembership value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1187061 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3212917 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• A new formula for the Shapley value
• Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
• Dissection of solutions in cooperative game theory using representation techniques
• Equal treatment, symmetry and Banzhaf value axiomatizations
• Equivalent N-Person Games and the Null Space of the Shapley Value
• Minimum norm solutions for cooperative games
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
• Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value
• The Orthogonal Decomposition of Games and an Averaging Formula for the Shapley Value
• The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
• The least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. Two values for TU games based on the excess vector
• The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
• Value Theory Without Efficiency
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• Weak values, the core, and new axioms for the Shapley value

Cited in

(4)

• A note on associated consistency and linear, symmetric values
• Representation theory of the symmetric group in voting theory and game theory
• Marginality and the position value
• Marginality and Myerson values

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