On membership and marginal values
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Publication:2376072
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1187061 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3212917 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- A new formula for the Shapley value
- Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
- Dissection of solutions in cooperative game theory using representation techniques
- Equal treatment, symmetry and Banzhaf value axiomatizations
- Equivalent N-Person Games and the Null Space of the Shapley Value
- Minimum norm solutions for cooperative games
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value
- The Orthogonal Decomposition of Games and an Averaging Formula for the Shapley Value
- The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
- The least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. Two values for TU games based on the excess vector
- The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
- Value Theory Without Efficiency
- Values of Non-Atomic Games
- Weak values, the core, and new axioms for the Shapley value
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