Weak values, the core, and new axioms for the Shapley value
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Publication:1106751
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(86)90045-4zbMath0651.90101WikidataQ114684125 ScholiaQ114684125MaRDI QIDQ1106751
Norman L. Kleinberg, Jeffrey H. Weiss
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(86)90045-4
Shapley value; core; monotonicity axiom; linear symmetric values; projection axiom; strategic risk neutrality axiom; super-additive games
91A12: Cooperative games
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Cites Work
- Competitive and value allocations of large exchange economies
- The representation theory of the symmetric groups
- Equivalent N-Person Games and the Null Space of the Shapley Value
- Value Theory Without Efficiency
- The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
- Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
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