Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
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Publication:4197572
DOI10.1287/moor.4.2.99zbMath0409.90008OpenAlexW1977911709MaRDI QIDQ4197572
Pradeep Dubey, Lloyd S. Shapley
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.4.2.99
BibliographyVotingLimit TheoremsSwitching FunctionsBanzhaf IndexPolitical PowerSimple GameThreshold LogicWeighted Majority Game
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