The geometry of voting power: weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.12.001MaRDI QIDQ2442820zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nicolas Houy, William S. Zwicker

Publication date 1 April 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

ellipsoidal separabilitysimple gamesvoting powerweighted voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• A characterization of the rational mean neat voting rules
• A Characterization of Weighted Voting
• Cases where the Penrose limit theorem does not hold
• Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
• Convex decompositions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1470897 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1357433 (Why is no real title available?)
• Interval measures of power
• L S Penrose's limit theorem: tests by simulation
• L. S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases.
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Regular simple games
• Roughly weighted hierarchical simple games
• The median procedure in cluster analysis and social choice theory
• The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting
• Voting and collective decision-making. Bargaining and power
• Voting power and proportional representation of voters
• Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention
• Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
• Weighted and roughly weighted simple games

Cited in

(7)

• Representation-compatible power indices
• On the characterization of weighted simple games
• Amplitude of weighted representation of voting games with several levels of approval
• Weighted committee games
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• Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice

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