The geometry of voting power: weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids
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Publication:2442820
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.001zbMath1290.91053MaRDI QIDQ2442820
Nicolas Houy, William S. Zwicker
Publication date: 1 April 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.001
91B12: Voting theory
Related Items
Representation-compatible power indices, On the characterization of weighted simple games, Amplitude of weighted representation of voting games with several levels of approval, Weighted committee games
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