scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1470897

Publication date: 9 July 2000

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

Shapley-Shubik index simple voting game I-power P-power

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Voting theory (91B12) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01)

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