On the nucleolus as a power index

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_15MaRDI QIDQ4644763zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Maria Montero

Publication date 8 January 2019

Published in Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_15

zbMATH Keywords

simple gamepower indexwinning coalitiongrand coalitionpayoff vector

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Bargaining and Value
• Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
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• Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value
• Inferior players in simple games
• Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
• Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
• On Weights of Constant-Sum Majority Games
• On the Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices revisited.
• The Modified Nucleolus as Canonical Representation of Weighted Majority Games
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
• The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
• The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• The least core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• Utility functions for simple games
• Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics

Cited in

(9)

• The nucleolus of large majority games
• The least square nucleolus is a normalized Banzhaf value
• Brexit and power in the Council of the European Union
• Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
• Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value
• Constructive and blocking powers in some applications
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 149952 (Why is no real title available?)
• Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory
• Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games

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