Utility functions for simple games

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90022-9zbMath0429.90091OpenAlexW2067569299MaRDI QIDQ1137946

Alvin E. Roth

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uiug.30112057881671

zbMATH Keywords

characteristic functionsimple gamespower indicesShapley-Shubik indexBanzhaf indexn-person cooperative gamespolitical gamevon Neumann- Morgenstern utility functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Utility theory (91B16) Decision theory for games (91A35) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Related Items

A class of non-normalized power indices for simple games, Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power -- A critical re-appraisal, The degree measure as utility function over positions in graphs and digraphs, Properties of ladder tournaments, Subjective evaluations of n-person games, Characterization of the Shapley-Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom, On the Nucleolus as a Power Index, Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games, Potential, value, and coalition formation, SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER, SOME OPEN PROBLEMS IN SIMPLE GAMES

Cites Work

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• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
• An Axiomatic Approach to Measurable Utility