SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER

DOI10.1142/S021919890300088XzbMath1089.91009OpenAlexW2046034121MaRDI QIDQ4462684

Federico Valenciano, Annick Laruelle

Publication date: 18 May 2004

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919890300088x

zbMATH Keywords

collective decision-makingaxiomatizationpower indicesvoting powerexpected-utility preferencesSemivalues

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (10)

The inverse problem for power distributions in committees ⋮ The effects of excluding coalitions ⋮ Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters ⋮ On ordinal equivalence of power measures given by regular semivalues ⋮ Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index ⋮ An axiomatization of success ⋮ Reflections on Power, Voting, and Voting Power ⋮ Voting and Power ⋮ Monotonicity of power and power measures ⋮ Potential, value, and coalition formation

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Subjective evaluations of n-person games
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Utility functions for simple games
• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• Weighted weak semivalues
• Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf Indices Revisited
• Semivalues of Simple Games
• Value Theory Without Efficiency
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• An Axiomatic Approach to Measurable Utility

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