Voting and power
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Publication:4644756
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_8zbMATH Open1419.91252OpenAlexW2239409213MaRDI QIDQ4644756FDOQ4644756
Authors: Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano
Publication date: 8 January 2019
Published in: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_8
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Cited In (6)
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