Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
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Cites work
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Cited in
(26)- Cooperative bargaining foundations of the Shapley-Shubik index
- A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability
- The Owen and Shapley spatial power indices: a comparison and a generalization
- A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution
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- Reflections on power, voting, and voting power
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- Delay, multiplicity, and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games
- Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence
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