Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
From MaRDI portal
Publication:926898
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.09.003zbMATH Open1134.91360OpenAlexW1971263970MaRDI QIDQ926898FDOQ926898
Federico Valenciano, Annick Laruelle
Publication date: 21 May 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.003
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The Bargaining Problem
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Bargaining and Value
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- Nonsymmetric Nash solutions and replications of 2-person bargaining
- A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
- On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
- Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining
- Value Theory Without Efficiency
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
- Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory
- Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
- Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
- The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions
- A bargaining approach to the Owen value and the Nash solution with coalition structure
- Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
- SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER
Cited In (23)
- Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence
- Bargaining, conditional consistency, and weighted lexicographic Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions
- Influence functions, followers and command games
- Dynamic bargaining with voluntary participation and externalities
- Veto Players and Non-Cooperative Foundations of Power in Legislative Bargaining
- Reflections on Power, Voting, and Voting Power
- Voting and Power
- A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability
- On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria
- Delay, multiplicity, and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games
- Bargaining delay under partial breakdowns and externalities
- Multi-lateral strategic bargaining without stationarity
- On the Nucleolus as a Power Index
- One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities
- Consensus reaching in committees
- Equilibrium payoffs and proposal ratios in bargaining models
- The Owen and Shapley spatial power indices: a comparison and a generalization
- A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution
- On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols
- Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: theory and application
- Pledge-and-review bargaining
- Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
- Optimal recommendation in two-player bargaining games
This page was built for publication: Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q926898)
