Influence functions, followers and command games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:536083
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.003zbMath1236.91021MaRDI QIDQ536083
Michel Grabisch, Agnieszka Rusinowska
Publication date: 16 May 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.003
influence function; kernel; command function; command game; follower function; lower and upper inverses; minimal sets generating a command game
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