Strongly stable networks

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.08.004zbMath1099.91011OpenAlexW3022532116MaRDI QIDQ2485489

Anne van den Nouweland, Matthew O. Jackson

Publication date: 5 August 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110714-141603317

zbMATH Keywords

Core Network formation Strong stability Allocation rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10)

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