Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.010zbMath1132.91533MaRDI QIDQ2469856

Marco Slikker

Publication date: 11 February 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.010

zbMATH Keywords

characterizations; networks; value functions; mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B50: General equilibrium theory

Related Items

Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures, Realizing fair outcomes in minimum cost spanning tree problems through non-cooperative mechanisms, Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions, Smooth multibidding mechanisms, A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games, A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value

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