Conference structures and fair allocation rules
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Publication:1143321
DOI10.1007/BF01781371zbMath0441.90117OpenAlexW3123605639MaRDI QIDQ1143321
Publication date: 1980
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01781371
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