The proportional Shapley value and applications

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.010zbMath1400.91013MaRDI QIDQ1651258

Sylvain Ferrières, Philippe Solal, Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.010

zbMATH Keywords

potential; proportionality; Harsanyi dividends; (weighted) Shapley value; land production economy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91A43: Games involving graphs

91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)

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Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value, Balanced externalities and the proportional allocation of nonseparable contributions, Weakly balanced contributions and solutions for cooperative games, Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution, Compromising between the proportional and equal division values, Axiomatizations of the proportional division value, Values for level structures with polynomial-time algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations, The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration, Axiomatization of the counting rule for cost-sharing with possibly redundant items, Sharing the surplus and proportional values, Impacts of boycotts concerning the Shapley value and extensions, Equal loss under separatorization and egalitarian values, Modelling coalitions: from concept formation to tailoring empirical explanations, The Shapley value, the proper Shapley value, and sharing rules for cooperative ventures, Axiomatizations of the proportional Shapley value, Disjointly productive players and the Shapley value, The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies

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