Solidarity within a fixed community
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Publication:2345267
Recommendations
- Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values
- On a class of solidarity values
- A solidarity value for n-person transferable utility games
- Nullified equal loss property and equal division values
- Modeling values for TU-games using generalized versions of consistency, standardness and the null player property
Cites work
- A new axiomatization of the Shapley value
- Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
- Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
- Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games
- Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
- Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value
Cited in
(17)- Toward a theory of solidarity
- Values for environments with externalities -- the average approach
- The proportional Shapley value and applications
- Nullified equal loss property and equal division values
- Is the solidarity value close to the equal split value?
- Soul of the community: an attempt to assess attachment to a community
- Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
- Coalitional desirability and the equal division value
- Characterizations of weighted and equal division values
- Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
- The fairness of solidarity bills under the solidarity value of Nowak and Radzik
- Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
- Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value
- Potentials and solutions of cooperative games with a fixed player set
- Sign properties and axiomatizations of the weighted division values
- The permission-Owen value: axiomatization and application to liability situations
- Nullified-game consistency and axiomatizations of the core of TU-games with a fixed player set
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