Solidarity within a fixed community

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.10.023zbMath1311.91012OpenAlexW2086478242MaRDI QIDQ2345267

Eric Rémila, Sylvain Béal, Frank Huettner, André Casajus, Philippe Solal

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.023

zbMATH Keywords

nullified solidaritypopulation solidarityweak fairnessequal division value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (10)

Characterizations of weighted and equal division values ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification ⋮ Coalitional desirability and the equal division value ⋮ Values for environments with externalities -- the average approach ⋮ The proportional Shapley value and applications ⋮ Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value ⋮ Potentials and solutions of cooperative games with a fixed player set ⋮ Nullified equal loss property and equal division values ⋮ Effects of Players’ Nullification and Equal (Surplus) Division Values ⋮ Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games
• Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value
• Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
• Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
• A new axiomatization of the Shapley value
• Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
• Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value

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