Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
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Publication:4608751
Recommendations
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- Players' nullification and the weighted (surplus) division values
- Nullified equal loss property and equal division values
- Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
- Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1031402 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
- Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property
- Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
- Characterizations of weighted and equal division values
- Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games
- Differential marginality, van den Brink fairness, and the Shapley value
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- Monotonicity implies linearity: characterizations of convex combinations of solutions to cooperative games
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
- Nullified equal loss property and equal division values
- Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value
- Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
- Properties based on relative contributions for cooperative games with transferable utilities
- Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
- Solidarity within a fixed community
- The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure
- The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
- Uniqueness of the Shapley value
- Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games
- Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
Cited in
(16)- A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games
- Characterizations of weighted and equal division values
- Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
- Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
- Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values
- Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values
- Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
- Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions
- NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS
- Equal loss under separatorization and egalitarian values
- Players' nullification and the weighted (surplus) division values
- Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
- Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games
- Coalitional desirability and the equal division value
- Novel equal division values based on players' excess vectors and their applications to logistics enterprise coalitions
- The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value
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