The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
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Publication:2642558
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0192-1zbMath1180.91039OpenAlexW3125424835MaRDI QIDQ2642558
Pieter H. M. Ruys, Yuan Ju, P. E. M. Borm
Publication date: 17 August 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0192-1
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Cites Work
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- On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
- An iterative procedure for evaluating digraph competitions
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- Externalities and compensation: Primeval games and solutions
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
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