The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
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Publication:2642558
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Cites work
- An iterative procedure for evaluating digraph competitions
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Externalities and compensation: Primeval games and solutions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
Cited in
(66)- Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach
- Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
- Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games
- Values for environments with externalities -- the average approach
- Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games
- Nullified equal loss property and equal division values
- Monotonicity implies linearity: characterizations of convex combinations of solutions to cooperative games
- Linear symmetric rankings for TU-games
- ``Procedural values for cooperative games
- Axiomatic characterizations of the egalitarian solidarity values
- Consensus mechanism with maximum-return modifications and minimum-cost feedback: a perspective of game theory
- Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values
- Necessary players and values
- The equal collective gains value in cooperative games
- The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility
- Sharing the surplus and proportional values
- Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value
- Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies
- Generalizations of Sobolev's consistency and values for TU-games
- Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations
- Recursive and bargaining values
- Smooth multibidding mechanisms
- Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games
- Procedural and optimization implementation of the weighted ENSC value
- A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance
- Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
- Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results
- On an extension of the concept of TU-games and their values
- A new axiomatization of the Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure
- Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
- Externalities and compensation: Primeval games and solutions
- A note on sign symmetry for a subclass of efficient, symmetric, and linear values
- The river sharing problem: a survey
- The Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure
- A consensus value for games with coalition structure
- Ordinal equivalence of values, Pigou-Dalton transfers and inequality in TU-games
- Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games
- Axiomatizations and a Noncooperative Interpretation of the α-CIS Value
- THE CONSENSUS VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM
- The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures
- Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
- A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games
- Pyramidal values
- The efficient, symmetric and linear values for cooperative games and their characterizations
- On a new method of analyzing properties of efficient, symmetric and linear values of TU-games
- A matching value for cooperative games
- Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value
- Selfish-dilemma consensus analysis for group decision making in the perspective of cooperative game theory
- Random conjugates of bankruptcy rules
- A generalization of the CIS value for cooperative cost games
- Equal support from others for unproductive players: efficient and linear values that satisfy the equal treatment and weak null player out properties for cooperative games
- Cohesive players: characterizations of a subclass of efficient, symmetric, and linear values
- Solidarity and fair taxation in TU games
- Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
- Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: sharing the joint gain of cooperation
- Linear efficient and symmetric power indices
- Combining the Shapley value and the equal division solution: an overview
- Atkinson-Shapley rules for TU-games: on the trade-off between efficiency and inequality
- Sharing the cost of hazardous transportation networks and the priority Shapley value for multi-choice games
- Cooperative games with unpaid players
- Bidding with coalitional externalities: a strategic approach to partition function form games
- Null players, solidarity, and a generalization of the egalitarian Shapley values
- On egalitarian values for cooperative games with a priori unions
- Axioms of invariance for TU-games
- Implementation and axiomatization of discounted Shapley values
- The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations
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