Axioms of invariance for TU-games
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Publication:891333
DOI10.1007/S00182-014-0458-2zbMATH Open1388.91019OpenAlexW2087121928MaRDI QIDQ891333FDOQ891333
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance
- A new axiomatization of the Shapley value
- A solidarity value for \(n\)-person transferable utility games
- An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property
- Associated consistency and Shapley value
- Associated consistency and values for TU games
- Collusion properties of values
- Decomposition of the space of TU-games, strong transfer invariance and the Banzhaf value
- Equal treatment, symmetry and Banzhaf value axiomatizations
- Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: sharing the joint gain of cooperation
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- On a family of values for TU-games generalizing the Shapley value
- The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
- The family of least square values for transferable utility games
- Weak addition invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value
- Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
- Young's axiomatization of the Shapley value: a new proof
Cited in
(21)- Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results
- A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games
- Characterizations of weighted and equal division values
- Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
- Cross invariance, the Shapley value, and the Shapley-Shubik power index
- Consistent and covariant solutions for TU games
- Values for environments with externalities -- the average approach
- New axiomatizations of values of TU-games using reduction properties
- Characterization of the average tree solution and its kernel
- Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value
- A decomposition of the space of TU-games using addition and transfer invariance
- Nullified equal loss property and equal division values
- Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
- Weak addition invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value
- On an extension of the concept of TU-games and their values
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5919913 (Why is no real title available?)
- Value-free reductions
- Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games
- On shift-invariant solutions for TU-games
- Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions
- Coalitional desirability and the equal division value
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