Monotonic solutions of cooperative games

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Publication:1060978

DOI10.1007/BF01769885zbMath0569.90106OpenAlexW2102099143WikidataQ56387530 ScholiaQ56387530MaRDI QIDQ1060978

H. Peyton Young

Publication date: 1985

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769885



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