A weak monotonicity property of the nucleolus
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The nucleolus of a transferable utility coalition game as a solution concept possesses various useful properties. However, it generally fails the monotonicity in the classical sense. The goal of the paper under review is to suggest a weaker but yet reasonable concept of monotonicity which is satisfied by the nucleolus and many other concepts derived from it in the framework of transferable utility games.
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(13)- Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems
- The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games
- The least square nucleolus is a general nucleolus
- The central core and the mid-central core as novel set-valued and point-valued solution concepts for transferable utility coalitional games
- Considerations on the aggregate monotonicity of the nucleolus and the core-center
- Monotonic core solutions: beyond Young's theorem
- A natural selection from the core of a TU game: the core-center
- Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 149952 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Cross-evaluation values and their applications to profit or cost allocation in collaborative logistics
- Axiomatization of the core of assignment games
- Monotonicity properties of the nucleolus on the domain of veto balanced games
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