The central core and the mid-central core as novel set-valued and point-valued solution concepts for transferable utility coalitional games
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Publication:2019340
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.10.003zbMath1461.91027OpenAlexW3094388787MaRDI QIDQ2019340
Publication date: 26 April 2021
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.10.003
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