The central core and the mid-central core as novel set-valued and point-valued solution concepts for transferable utility coalitional games

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2020.10.003MaRDI QIDQ2019340zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marco Rogna

Publication date 26 April 2021

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.10.003

zbMATH Keywords

optimizationaxiomatizationcooperative game theorysolution concepts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139280 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099360 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
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• A weak monotonicity property of the nucleolus
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• Consistency and its converse: an introduction
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• Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
• Minimal cooperation in bargaining
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Monotonicity implies linearity: characterizations of convex combinations of solutions to cooperative games
• On the equal division core
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution
• Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
• Stationary perfect equilibria of an \(n\)-person noncooperative bargaining game and cooperative solution concepts
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The aggregate-monotonic core
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• Theory of games and economic behavior.

Cited in

(3)

• The unbinding core for coalitional form games
• Nonempty core-type solutions over balanced coalitions in TU-games
• The intermediate set and limiting superdifferential for coalitional games: between the core and the Weber set

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