Monotonicity implies linearity: characterizations of convex combinations of solutions to cooperative games
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Publication:1704072
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Cites work
- A First Course in Optimization Theory
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Cited in
(23)- Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions
- Deriving Egalitarian and proportional principles from individual monotonicity
- Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions
- Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
- The in-group egalitarian Owen values
- Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games
- The central core and the mid-central core as novel set-valued and point-valued solution concepts for transferable utility coalitional games
- Equal support from others for unproductive players: efficient and linear values that satisfy the equal treatment and weak null player out properties for cooperative games
- Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values
- Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value
- A property of solutions to linear monopoly problems
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5583099 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Players' nullification and the weighted (surplus) division values
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- Monotonicity Properties of Interval Solutions and the Dutta–Ray Solution for Convex Interval Games
- Equal loss under separatorization and egalitarian values
- Toward a consensus on extended Shapley values for multi-choice games
- Axiomatizations of the proportional division value
- Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games
- The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration
- Fair allocation in hierarchies: a compromise between marginalism and egalitarianism
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