Monotonicity implies linearity: characterizations of convex combinations of solutions to cooperative games

DOI10.1007/S00355-017-1056-6zbMATH Open1392.91011OpenAlexW2613203402MaRDI QIDQ1704072FDOQ1704072

Authors: Koji Yokote, Yukihiko Funaki 

Publication date: 8 March 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1056-6

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zbMATH Keywords

monotonicitycooperative gameslinear solutionconvex combinations of solutions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Young's axiomatization of the Shapley value: a new proof
• Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
• Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
• Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
• Duality and anti-duality in TU games applied to solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations
• Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
• A First Course in Optimization Theory
• The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
• Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games
• Monotonic redistribution of performance-based allocations: A case for proportional taxation

Cited In (20)

• Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions
• Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions
• Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
• The in-group egalitarian Owen values
• Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games
• Equal support from others for unproductive players: efficient and linear values that satisfy the equal treatment and weak null player out properties for cooperative games
• The central core and the mid-central core as novel set-valued and point-valued solution concepts for transferable utility coalitional games
• Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values
• Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value
• A property of solutions to linear monopoly problems
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games
• Players' nullification and the weighted (surplus) division values
• Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
• The Egalitarian Shapley value: a generalization based on coalition sizes
• Monotonicity Properties of Interval Solutions and the Dutta–Ray Solution for Convex Interval Games
• Equal loss under separatorization and egalitarian values
• Axiomatizations of the proportional division value
• Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games
• The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration

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