Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games

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Publication:472188

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.004zbMath1309.91010OpenAlexW2076356337MaRDI QIDQ472188

André Casajus, Frank Huettner

Publication date: 19 November 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.004




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