Group contributions in TU-games: a class of k-lateral Shapley values

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2020.03.054MaRDI QIDQ2184155zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Surajit Borkotokey, Dhrubajit Choudhury, Loyimee Gogoi, Rajnish Kumar

Publication date 27 May 2020

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.03.054

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryShapley valueTU cooperative game\(k\)-lateral Shapley valuesgroup contributions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614541 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
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• A two-step Shapley value for cooperative games with coalition structures
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• An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property
• Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Implementation and axiomatization of discounted Shapley values
• Modeling values for TU-games using generalized versions of consistency, standardness and the null player property
• Models in Cooperative Game Theory
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
• Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values
• On a class of solidarity values
• On the symmetric and weighted Shapley values
• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• Random marginal and random removal values
• Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
• The Shapley Value as Aircraft Landing Fees–Revisited
• Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games
• Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
• ``Procedural values for cooperative games

Cited in

(8)

• Coalition structure value considering the outside alignment option of priori coalition
• Nash-stable coalition partition and potential functions in games with coalition structure
• A new value for cooperative games based on coalition size
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7448568 (Why is no real title available?)
• The Egalitarian Shapley value: a generalization based on coalition sizes
• Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities
• Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure
• The \(\alpha \)-egalitarian Myerson value of games with communication structure

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