Group contributions in TU-games: a class of k-lateral Shapley values

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2020.03.054zbMATH Open1443.91022OpenAlexW3012313914MaRDI QIDQ2184155FDOQ2184155

Authors: Surajit Borkotokey, Dhrubajit Choudhury, Loyimee Gogoi, Rajnish Kumar 

Publication date: 27 May 2020

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.03.054

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zbMATH Keywords

game theoryShapley valueTU cooperative game\(k\)-lateral Shapley valuesgroup contributions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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Cited In (8)

• Coalition structure value considering the outside alignment option of priori coalition
• A new value for cooperative games based on coalition size
• Nash-stable coalition partition and potential functions in games with coalition structure
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Egalitarian Shapley value: a generalization based on coalition sizes
• Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities
• Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure
• The \(\alpha \)-egalitarian Myerson value of games with communication structure

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