A two-step Shapley value for cooperative games with coalition structures
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Cites work
Cited in
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- Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions
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- The Shapley value for cooperative games with restricted worths
- Values for level structures with polynomial-time algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations
- Group contributions in TU-games: a class of k-lateral Shapley values
- On the Owen value and the property of balanced contributions within unions
- Potential functions for finding stable coalition structures
- The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure
- A Shapley value for games with restricted coalitions
- Two efficient values of cooperative games with graph structure based on \(\tau\)-values
- The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value
- Values for games with two-level communication structures
- Second-order productivity, second-order payoffs, and the Owen value
- Component-wise proportional solutions for communication graph games
- Coalitional values and cost allocation problems
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- An Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure
- The Shapley value, the Owen value, and the veil of ignorance
- The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures
- An axiomatic and non-cooperative approach to the multi-step Shapley value
- Dynamic Shapley Value for Two-Stage Cost Sharing Game
- Union-wise egalitarian solutions in cooperative games with a coalition structure
- Solidarity in games with a coalition structure
- Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure
- Values for cooperative games with a prior unions and a communication graph based on combined effects
- Null players, outside options, and stability: the conditional Shapley value
- The in-group egalitarian Owen values
- Two-level cooperation in network games
- Training, abilities and the structure of teams
- Cost allocation problems on highways with grouped users
- Value of games with two-layered hypergraphs
- A matrix approach to TU games with coalition and communication structures
- Fuzzy Harsanyi solutions for fuzzy level structure games with multi weight systems
- Equal surplus sharing values for games with coalition structures
- Rough Shapley functions for games with a priori unions
- On marginal feature attributions of tree-based models
- Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
- The Owen value for differential cooperative games with a coalition structure
- Cooperative games with diversity constraints
- The unison value for TU-games with coalition structure
- Weighted component-wise solutions for graph games
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