Cooperative games with coalition structures

DOI10.1007/BF01766876zbMath0313.90074MaRDI QIDQ1220434

Robert John Aumann, Jacques H. Drèze

Publication date: 1974

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

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Cites Work

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• The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
• The Structure of the Kernel of a Cooperative Game
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• On the Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game