The Structure of the Kernel of a Cooperative Game

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Publication:5557648

DOI10.1137/0115050zbMath0171.18704OpenAlexW2011660211MaRDI QIDQ5557648

Bezalel Peleg, Michael Maschler

Publication date: 1967

Published in: SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/0115050




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