A proof that the core of an ordinal convex game is a von Neumann- Morgenstern solution

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(86)90006-5zbMath0582.90109OpenAlexW2079064676MaRDI QIDQ1069868

Bezalel Peleg

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(86)90006-5

zbMATH Keywords

corereduced gamescooperative games without side paymentsordinal convex gamevon Neumann-Morgenstern solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (16)

On the sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set ⋮ STABILITY OF THE CORE IN A CLASS OF NTU GAMES: A CHARACTERIZATION ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems ⋮ Stability of topological effectivity functions ⋮ On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof ⋮ Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games ⋮ A consistent bargaining set ⋮ Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility ⋮ Strong convexity of NTU games ⋮ Comparative cooperative game theory ⋮ Computing the cores of strategic games with punishment-dominance relations ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of income tax rates in public good economies ⋮ Cores and large cores when population varies ⋮ An axiomatization of the weighted NTU value

Cites Work

• Convex games without side payments
• The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
• Cores of Convex Games Without Side Payments
• The Structure of the Kernel of a Cooperative Game
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