Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof
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Publication:1645200
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.04.001zbMath1395.91025OpenAlexW2802718198WikidataQ129968431 ScholiaQ129968431MaRDI QIDQ1645200
Naoki Watanabe, Toshiyuki Hirai
Publication date: 28 June 2018
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.04.001
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items
On the core of a patent licensing game, The kernel of a patent licensing game: the optimal number of licensees, Farsighted stability in patent licensing: an abstract game approach, Stable cores in information graph games
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