Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.10.002zbMath1285.91011OpenAlexW2147953864MaRDI QIDQ2447069

Marina Núñez, Carles Rafels

Publication date: 23 April 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.10.002

zbMATH Keywords

corevon Neumann-Morgenstern stable setassignment game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

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Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof, Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem, The minimum set of \(\mu\)-compatible subgames for obtaining a stable set in an assignment game, A survey on assignment markets, Stable sets in one-seller assignment games, Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets), Does it make sense to analyse a two-sided market as a multi-choice game?, An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets, Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems, Stable cores in information graph games, A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets

Cites Work

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• A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game
• The core of an \(m\)-sided assignment game
• Assignment games with stable core
• Buyer-seller exactness in the assignment game
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
• The assignment game. I: The core
• On the core and competitive equilibria of a market with indivisible goods
• A game with no solution