The minimum set of -compatible subgames for obtaining a stable set in an assignment game
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Publication:2689422
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Cites work
- A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets
- A polynomial-time algorithm to find von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matchings in marriage games
- A survey on assignment markets
- Assignment games with stable core
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1194817 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3084669 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the dimension of the core of the assignment game
- Stable sets in one-seller assignment games
- The assignment game. I: The core
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
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